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SUPREME COURT WATCH – RECENT DECISIONS
 

Charter of Rights  Equality rights   Limitation of actions  Whether limitation period applies to bar personal claims for constitutional relief and remedies under s.24(1) of the Charter

 
Name of Case: Ravndahl v. Saskatchewan

Date of Decision: January 29, 2009

Supreme Court Panel: Chief Justice Beverley McLachlin, Justices Ian Binnie, Louis LeBel, Marie Deschamps, Rosalie Abella, Louise Charron and Marshall Rothstein

Judgment under Appeal: Judgment of the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal dated June 14, 2007

Facts: When she remarried in 1984, Laura Ravndahl, whose first husband died in a 1975 workplace accident, lost her monthly spousal pension under Saskatchewan's Workers' Compensation Act because the Act provided that eligibility for a spousal pension ended upon remarriage. However, in 1985, because of the coming into effect of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the Saskatchewan government amended the Workers' Compensation Act to make surviving spouses of workplace accident victims eligible for a pension regardless of whether or not they remarried.

Unfortunately for Ravndahl, this amendment was made retroactive only to April 17, 1985, the date on which the equality provisions of s.15 of the Charter came into effect. Since Ravndahl had remarried some six months prior to this date, she and others in a similar situation did not benefit from the change and remained ineligible for the pension.

In 1999, to partially address the unfairness caused by the limited retroactivity of the 1985 amendment, the Saskatchewan government enacted the Special Payment (Dependent Spouses) Act to provide for a one-time $80,000 gratuitous payment to persons whose spousal pensions were terminated by virtue of remarriage prior to April 17, 1985, but this was made conditional on waiving all further claims in this regard. Rather than apply for this payment, Ravndahl initiated an action in 2000 in the Saskatchewan Court of Queen's Bench seeking a declaration under s.52 of the Constitution Act that the 1985 amending legislation, and the resulting provision in the Workers' Compensation Act limiting pension eligibility retroactivity for remarried spouses, were unconstitutional as discriminatory on the basis of sex, marital status and age contrary to the Charter of Rights.

Section 52(1) of the Constitution Act provides that "[t]he Constitution of Canada is the supreme law of Canada, and any law that is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution is, to the extent of the inconsistency, of no force or effect." Section 24(1) of the Charter, which is part of Canada's constitution, provides that "[a]nyone whose rights or freedoms, as guaranteed by this Charter, have been infringed or denied may apply to a court of competent jurisdiction to obtain such remedy as the court considers appropriate and just in the circumstances." In addition to a declaration under s.52 of the Constitution Act, Ravndahl sought an order under s.24(1) of the Charter reinstating her spousal pension with damages, pre-judgment interest and costs.

Case History: In a June 2004 decision, [2004] S.J. No. 374 (QL), a Saskatchewan Court of Queen's Bench judge dismissed Ravndahl's action on the basis that it was statute-barred by the time limits in the provincial Limitation of Actions Act which provides that a legal action must be initiated within six years from the date on which the cause of action arose. The judge reasoned that Ravndahl's whole action was essentially a claim for relief under s.24(1) of the Charter, and that her cause of action arose on April 17, 1985, when the equality provisions of the Charter came into force. Ravndahl appealed this decision to the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal.

In a June 14, 2007 majority decision (see Lancaster's Labour Law E-Bulletin, July 14, 2008, Issue No. 214), the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal partially allowed Ravndahl's appeal. It held that she could seek a declaration of unconstitutionality of the impugned legislation because such applications under s.52 of the Constitution Act were not time-limited, but that such a declaration would not allow her to claim her pension and damages under s.24(1) of the Charter because the provincial Limitation of Actions Act precluded such a claim.

The appellate court cited the statement of the Supreme Court of Canada in Schachter v. Canada, [1992] S.C.J. No. 68 (QL) that "[a]n individual remedy under s.24(1) of the Charter will rarely be available in conjunction with [an] action under s.52 of the Constitution Act, 1982. Ordinarily, where a provision is declared unconstitutional and immediately struck down pursuant to s.52, that will be the end of the matter. No retroactive s.24 remedy will be available." Ruling that "[t]he claim for a declaration of invalidity of the legislation in itself is ... severable and the Chambers judge erred in striking it out," but that "the Chambers judge was correct in ... holding that the limitation periods applied to claims for the personal relief sought in ... the statement of claim," the Court of Appeal left Ravndahl in the position of being able to seek a declaration that the impugned legislative provisions were unconstitutional, but not being able to benefit financially from any such declaration by seeking reinstatement of her pension as well as damages. She obtained leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.

Issue(s): Before the Supreme Court Ravndahl conceded that the statutory limitation period under the provincial Limitation of Actions Act applied to personal claims for constitutional relief such as hers. The remaining issue to be decided was whether Ravndahl's claim was nonetheless within the six-year statutory time limit because a new cause of action arose in 1999 when the Saskatchewan government passed the Special Payment (Dependent Spouses) Act.

Supreme Court's Decision (7-0): The appeal was dismissed.

Reasons: Ruling that "[i]n this case, there is but one cause of action which arose on April 17, 1985, when s.15 of the Charter came into force," the Supreme Court of Canada upheld the lower courts' decision that Ravndahl's pursuit of a personal remedy was statute-barred and dismissed her appeal.

Writing the unanimous decision of a seven-member panel of the Court, Chief Justice Beverley McLachlin held that "[Ravndahl] was denied benefits pursuant to the operation of s.68(1) of the 1978 [Workers' Compensation] Act. However, she had no cognizable legal right upon which to base her claim until s.15 of the Charter came into force. On April 17, 1985 a claim that the non-receipt of benefits pursuant to s.68(1) of the 1978 Act discriminated against her on the basis of marital status became actionable. Although [Ravndahl] does not directly challenge the constitutionality of the 1978 Act, it is the operation of the 1978 Act that ultimately forms the basis of her discrimination claim."

Chief Justice McLachlin rejected Ravndahl's argument that a new cause of action arose in 1999 when the Saskatchewan government enacted the Special Payment (Dependent Spouses) Act, holding that "[her] cause of action must be based ... on the unconstitutionality of the 1978 Act. Subsequent attempts by the Legislature to lessen the discriminatory effects of legislation do not create a new cause of action in her favour."

Ruling that "[Ravndahl's] personal claims, which were commenced almost a decade out of time, are statute-barred," McLachlin dismissed the appeal. However, she added that this did not necessarily mean that Ravndahl might not benefit financially if she succeeded in her Charter challenge. The Chief Justice noted that "[i]t is important to distinguish [Ravndahl's] personal ... remedies, brought by her as an individual, from ... [a] remedy flowing from s.52 that may extend a benefit to [her] and all similarly affected persons." She explained that "[i]t will be for the trial judge to determine whether a declaration of invalidity should be granted, and if so, what remedies if any should be granted. Because [Ravndahl's] personal claims are statute-barred, any remedies flowing from s.52 would not be personal remedies, but would be remedies from which [she], as an affected person, might benefit."

Lancaster Reference: For analysis of the Supreme Court of Canada's decision, see Lancaster's Human Rights and Workplace Privacy E-Bulletin, August 6, 2009, Issue No. 124.

Full text of the decision: http://onlinedb.lancasterhouse.com/images/up-SCC_Ravndahl.pdf

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